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Introduction
IPO firm executives are significant net sellers in the year immediately following the 
IPO year. Two significant variables affecting their sales are the number of stock options 
exercised during the year and the number of shares held at the end of the preceding year. 
Contrary to the findings of the previous studies, the number of stock options and the number 
of restricted stocks turn out to be insignificant. The evidence suggests that IPO executives sell 
mainly to realize a significant part of their undiversified wealth; however, they do not sell to 
explicitly hedge against stock option grants or to exploit potential overvaluation.
* Jaemin Kim is an Assistant Professor o f Finance at the College o f Business Administration, San Diego State 
University. His research interests are in the areas o f  corporate payout policy, executive compensation, and 
international finance. He currently teaches Financing the Emerging Enterprise and Fundamentals o f  Finance. He 
holds Ph.D. from the University o f Washington.
** Kuntara Pukthuanthong is an Assistant Professor o f  Finance at the College o f  Business Administration, San 
Diego State University. Her research interests include topics in initial public offerings, executive/employee 
compensation, and entrepreneurship. She currently teaches International Business Finance and Entrepreneurial 
Finance. She holds a doctorate degree o f  business administration from the University o f California, Irvine.
Compared to large, established corporations, young and small IPO firms have to make 
a broader set of decisions that will have substantial impacts on future performance. Such 
important decisions include choices on organizational structure, control mechanisms, board 
composition, and employee/executive compensation as well as various operational 
arrangements. Moreover, many such managerial functions take place in a dynamic 
environment, where new equity is raised and thus ownership structure undergoes major 
changes.
With respect to the compensation issue, one of the most popular methods for pre-IPO 
or newly listed firms (hereafter IPO firms) to compensate their executives is equity-based 
arrangements, i.e. stocks and stock options.^ Equity based compensation is heavily used by 
IPO firms, because many firms in the IPO stage experience a relative lack of cash and face 
potentially large agency costs arising from uncertainty and risk inherent in small and 
unknown firms. While the executives of IPO firms continue to receive stock options and 
restricted stocks, they can sell part of their firms’ stock at the time of IPO or at the expiration 
of a typical six month lock-up period after IPO. A rapid decline in ownership can increase 
agency costs, unwinding the intended incentive effect of stock options and restricted stocks.
In this paper, we focus on the executives of the firms that went public between 1992 
and 2002 to examine the determinants of their trading activities. To the best of our knowledge, 
how IPO firm executives trade, particularly in response to stock options and restricted stock 
grants, is a question that has received relatively little attention in previous studies. A potential 
exception to this is Ofek and Yermack (2000) who found that executives with higher 
ownership hedge stock options by selling unrestricted stocks that they already own, thus 
effectively undoing the incentive effect. By focusing on IPO firms with heavier use of equity- 
based compensation, we complement the existing literature by exploring questions that 
include: 1) are IPO executives net-sellers or net-buyers of their own firms’ stocks?; 2) what 
affects their buy or sell trades?; and 3) do they sell to explicitly hedge against stock option 
grants or restricted stock grants, thereby neutralizing the incentive effect of stock options?
First of all, we find that IPO firm executives are significant net sellers in the year 
immediately following the IPO year. On average, these executives sell 21 % of the combined 
number of (i) the shares held at the end of the IPO year; plus (ii) the shares obtained through 
option exercise in the year immediately following the IPO year; plus (iii) the restricted shares 
awarded in the year immediately following the IPO year. The result of the significant net sales 
by executives is not driven by a small number of extremely large records, or outliers, typically 
observed in executive compensation data. Such selling intensity appears to taper off after the 
first two years. Second, the two significant factors affecting selling activities by IPO firm 
executives are the number of shares held at the beginning of the year and the number of stock 
options exercised during the year. In particular, we find that about every share acquired 
through option exercise is sold. This finding is robust to different specifications with respect 
to outliers, the high-tech bubble period, and inclusion of various control variables. Third, the 
number of restricted stocks, and particularly the number of stock options, turn out to be
 ^ Use o f  equity based compensation by U.S. corporations increased substantially in the 1990’s. Bebchuk and 
Grinstein (2005) document that for the top five executives o f  S&P 500 firms, equity based compensation was 
37 % o f  their total compensation in 1993, and this portion increased to 55 % by 2003. Employee stock options, 
in particular, have been a popular form o f compensation. According to Jones and Burchman (2002) and 
Weisbermer (2000), by the mid-1990s, more than nine out o f  ten U.S. companies were granting stock options.
insignificant. In other words, the evidence in this study does not support the view that IPO 
firm executives explicitly hedge stock option grants by selling unrestricted shares they already 
own, or that theses executives sell as many unrestricted stocks as restricted stocks awarded to 
them. This finding differs from the study by Ofek and Yermack (2000). Fourth, our study 
shows that IPO underpricing, changes in market-to-book ratio, and changes in stock return 
volatility do not influence the trading activities of the IPO firm executives. If IPO 
underpricing, as measured by the first day closing price over the offer price minus one, 
proxies executive’s profit-taking incentives, then this profit motive does not explain executive 
sales. Similarly, potential overvaluation, as measured by an increase in market-to-book ratio, 
does not lead to more selling by executives.
The result that IPO executives sell significantly is consistent with the popular view. 
Our contribution lies in shedding light on the determinants of such selling activity by IPO 
executives: as IPO firm executives sell significantly, particularly in the first two year period 
around IPO, the two important factors influencing their selling trades are the number of shares 
held at the beginning of the year and the number of stock options exercised during the year, 
but not other variables mentioned above. This taken together with other results of this study 
suggests that IPO firm executives sell mainly to realize a significant part of their wealth tied 
up in their firms, and thus reduce risks embedded in their undiversified portfolios. These IPO 
executives have incentives to unwind their a priori undiversified positions, because a 
substantial amount of their wealth is in the form of their own firms’ stocks or stock options. In 
addition, the value of their human capital is significantly correlated with their firms’ 
performance. Again, however, we do not find evidence that the executives sell to explicitly 
hedge against stock option grants or to exploit potential mispricing.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the sample, data, and variables 
used in this study. Section 2 and Section 3 provide univariate analyses and multiple 
regressions, respectively. We conclude in Section 4. And, in the Appendix, we offer brief 
institutional details on executive stock options and restricted stocks.
I. Data, sample, and descriptive statistics
A. Data and sample
As we examine the trading activity and equity compensation of the executives of the 
firms that went public for the period 1992-2002, the primary data sources are the Thomson 
Financial SDC IPO database and the S&P ExecuComp. We exclude from the IPO dataset 
close-end funds, REITs, financial institutions, ADRs of companies already listed in their 
home countries, and limited partnerships, consistent with the criteria used in previous studies 
(Ritter (1991), and Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999)). We supplement the IPO dataset 
with prospectuses collected from the SEC Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval 
(EDGAR) service. ExecuComp provides annual compensation data for proxy named 
executives, or the five highest paid executives, for the companies listed in S&P 1500 (S&P 
500, S&P Mid-cap 400, S&P Small-cap 600). Thus, our sample consists of IPO firm 
executives whose compensation data exist in S&P ExecuComp. We also use CRSP and 
Compustat for other variables used in this study. Variables are constructed year by year for 
each executive, and the final sample consists of 3,999 executive-years for 940 executives 
from 236 IPO firms between 1992 and 2002.
B. Descriptive statistics and variable definitions
Table I provides an overview of the characteristics of the 236 IPO firms (1992-2002) 
that have data in the S&P ExecuComp database. Yearly tabulation shows that more than 50 % 
of the total IPOs took place during the high-tech boom years from 1996 to 1999. The number 
of IPOs decreased rapidly in the post-bubble years, 2000, 2001, and 2002. Profitability, as 
measured by after-tax net income in the most recent 12-month period before the IPO, is on 
average 25.8 million dollars for the entire sample period. It is notable that the mean value of 
the after-tax net income, after peaking in 1997 (43.8 million), turns negative in 1998 (-10.6 
million dollars). In 1998, both the mean and median revenues, as measured over the 12-month 
period before the IPO, are the lowest in the 1990s, although they go back up in 1999. The 
ages of IPO firms, as defined by the number of years between the founding date and the IPO 
date, show a declining tendency during the internet boom period. During the same period, the 
degree of underpricing, defined as the first-day closing price over the offer price minus one, 
increases sharply. In fact, the mean and median values of underpricing are the largest in 2000 
with the mean and median being 123.1 % and 64.3 %, respectively. In sum. Table I reveals a 
pattern that around the high-tech boom years, the profitability of IPO firms tends to decline 
and relatively younger firms go public with heavier underpricing.
As mentioned previously, variables used in this study are measured over a fiscal year 
(T) for each executive (i). For brevity, T’s and i’s are omitted from the notations when doing 
so causes no ambiguity. In Table II, we list the descriptive statistics for equity compensation 
and share ownership data for the executives of the 236 IPO firms, starting from the IPO year.^ 
SHROWN is the split-adjusted number of shares held by each executive at the yearend of a 
fiscal year. BLK VALU is the dollar value of stock options granted to an executive in a fiscal 
year, as measured by S&P Black-Scholes methodology. SOPTGRNT is the split-adjusted 
number of stock options granted to an executive in a fiscal year. RSTKGRNT is the dollar 
value, as of the grant date, of restricted stocks granted to an executive in a fiscal year. 
RSTK_SH is the estimated split-adjusted number of restricted stocks granted to an executive 
in a fiscal year, obtained by dividing RSTKGRNT with PRCCF, the fiscal yearend closing 
share price. SOPTEXSH is the split-adjusted number of stock options exercised by an 
executive in a fiscal year.
Table II shows that stock option is a more dominant form of executive equity 
compensation for IPO firms, as compared to restricted stock. In terms of mean dollar value, 
the stock option grants are more than 14 times of restricted stock grants. In terms of the 
number of shares granted, the mean and median for stock options far exceed those for 
restricted stocks. The average number of stock options an executive receives per year is 
215,166, whereas the average number restricted stocks an executive receives per year is 4,605. 
The median for stock option is 40,000, while the median for restricted stock is zero. 
Executives on average exercise 159,728 stock options per year. The ratio of SOPTEXSH to 
SOPTGRNT averaged over all the executive-years is more than 80 % (unreported in the table). 
This means that in a given year, executives exercise substantial amount of vested stock 
options they already own, relative to the number of new stock options they receive. As shown 
in Table II, it is noteworthy that executive compensation distributions are extremely right- 
skewed with SOPTGRNT being the most skewed: there are very large values in each 
compensation variable. For example, the ExecuComp data record that Margaret Whitman,
 ^Data for the years prior to the IPO year are unavailable in the ExecComp database with a very small number o f  
exceptions, which we didn’t include.
CEO of eBay Inc., received split-adjusted 172, 8 million stock options in 1998 when her firm 
went public, and exercised all of them in the same year. These numbers appear as the 
maximum values in both SOPTGRNT and SOPTEXSH in Table II. The issue of outliers will 
be addressed in the following sections.
II. Univariate analyses
Because executives exercise stock options and receive restricted stocks, the number of 
shares they hold (SHROWN) can increase even when executives are net sellers of their 
unrestricted shares. Thus, the number of shares sold minus the number of shares purchased by 
an executive in a year (NETSELL) is defined as the number of restricted stocks granted in a 
year plus the number of stock options exercised in a year minus the change in the number of 
shares held by an executive at the yearend, or (SOPTEXSH + RSTK SH -  ASHROWN). 
ASHROWN is (SHROWNt - SHROWNj.i).^
Panel A of Table III shows NETSELL as compared to SOPTGRANT, SOPTEXSH, 
RSTK SH, and SHROWNt-i during the first year after IPO, and Panel B for all the years 
combined. In Panel A, while NETSELL, SOPTGRNT, SOPTEXSH, and RSTK_SH are 
measured for the year immediately following the IPO year,"^  SHROWNj-i is measured at the 
end of the IPO year, or at the beginning of the following year. In the first year after IPO, 
NETSELL is on average 432,613 shares, amounting to 605 % of the combined value of 
SOPTEXSH and RSTK SH. In other words, an average executive sells much more shares 
than the shares they acquire through option exercise plus the restricted shares they receive. 
This means that an executive sells a significant chunk of the unrestricted shares that they 
already own. NETSELL is 22 % relative to SHROWNt-i . Panel A also shows NETSELL is 
21 % of SOPTEXSH, RSTK SH, and SHROWNt-i combined. That is, net sales by an 
average executive amount to 21 % of all the shares he would have possessed if he had not 
sold any share by the end of the year immediately following the IPO year.
In Panel B, where all the years are considered, executives’ selling intensity tapers off 
on average, although executives still sell quite a bit. Executives on average sell way more 
shares than they obtain through option exercise and stock awards (168 %). Also, NETSELL is 
13 % relative to SOPTEXSH, RSTK_SH, and SHROWNt-i combined. In terms of median 
values, executive selling is less intense compared to mean values (11-16 % compared to 13- 
21 %); however, the pattern of significant sales persists.
As observed in Table II, the skewness of the compensation variables is severe. To test 
whether the skewness arising from extreme positive values derives the results, we exclude 
2 % of the largest values of each of the four variables, SOPTGRANT, SOPTEXSH, 
RSTK_SH, and SHROWNt-i, and perform the same univariate analyses as above. The 
intensity of NETSELL, or % NETSELL, actually tends to increase further, suggesting that 
executive selling documented in Table III is not driven by outliers. The results without 
outliers are not reported here for brevity.
In Panel C of Table III, to further examine the significance of executive net sales, we 
perform hypothesis tests of zero mean and median for NETSELL in the year following the 
IPO year. Both tests show that NETSELL is highly significant with p-values less than 0.01, 
and the mean and median being 410,288 and 13,344 shares, respectively (Panel C).
 ^To put it another way, SHROWNj SHROWNj-i + SOPTEXSH + RSTK SH — NETSELL. 
 ^In the IPO year, NETSELL cannot be calculated due to the unavailability o f data.
Similar to Ofek and Yermack (2000), we split the sample into two groups based on the 
number of shares owned in the IPO year relative to the combined number of stock options and 
restricted stocks granted in the following year. Panel D is for the low ownership sub-sample, 
in which the number of shares held in the IPO year is less than the combined number of stock 
options and restricted stocks granted in the following year. And Panel E is for the high 
ownership sub-sample, in which the number of shares held in the IPO year is larger than the 
combined number of stock options and restricted stocks granted in the following year. Both 
panels again show that executives are on average significant net-sellers, regardless of the 
relative sizes of their initial holdings. In summary, the univariate results in Table III reveal 
that the executives of the IPO firms sell a significant portion of their stock holdings in the 
year following the year of initial public offering.
III. Regression analyses
A. Model
In our regression analyses of the trading activities of IPO firm executives, NETSELLj 
is regressed on four key variables of equity based executive compensation; the number of 
stock options granted (SOPTGRNTt), the number of stock options exercised (SOPTEXSHt), 
the number of restricted stocks granted (RSTK SHj), and the number of shares held in the 
previous yearend (SHROWNt-i). Also as control variables, underpricing (UNDERPRC), 
changes in market-to-book ratio (AMKTBK) and return volatility (AVOLAT) are included. 
More formally, our base model is as follows:
NETSELLij =Co + CjSOPTGRNTij + C2S0PTEXSHtj + CsRSTKJHij +
C4SHROWNij.i + CsUNDERPRC + CsAMKTBKij + CyAVOLATij + Sij (1)
If executives wish to hedge the risk arising from stock options granted to them, then 
they will sell the unrestricted shares they already own. Based on the Black-Scholes option 
valuation model, executives will sell the number of shares equal to the option hedge ratio 
times the number of options granted. This suggests a positive relation between net sales by 
executives (NETSELL) and the number of stock options granted to executives (SOPTGRNT) 
(Ofek and Yermack (2000)).^
In addition to the number of granted stock options (SOPTGRNT), the number of 
exercised stock options (SOPTEXSH) is included in the regression. The standard portfolio 
theory predicts that as the number of exercised stock options increases the number of shares 
executives hold, other things being equal, they will sell newly acquired shares, or increase 
their net sales (NETSELL), to diversify and rebalance their portfolios.
The same diversification argument applies to restricted stock grants. A higher number 
of restricted stocks granted to an executive will lead to more selling by the executive. The 
number of restricted stocks granted (RSTK SH) is predicted to be positively associated with 
executive’s net sales (NETSELL).
Ofek and Yermack (2000) document that executives with higher ownership tend to 
sell more aggressively than the executives with lower ownership, consistent with the portfolio
 ^Alternatively, i f  the value o f stock option increases, for instance, due to a rise in stock price, then executives 
can also increase share sales to hedge the risk, as the option delta goes up. We do not test this in this study, as the 
data source does not provide full information on stock option value changes.
theory that once certain ownership level is reached, investors actively rebalance their 
portfolios. To account for prior ownership levels, we include SHROWNj-i.^
The relation between the number of stock options and the degree of underpricing has 
been explored in the literature (Lowry and Murphy (2005), Rocholl (2005), Taranto (2003)). 
Although evidence is inconclusive on the significance of such a relation, underpricing can 
induce executives’ selling activity to the extent that the degree of underpricing proxies 
executives’ profit-taking incentives (Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002)). If so, the 
coefficient for UNDERPRC (underpricing) will have a positive sign. UNDERPRC is defined 
as the first day closing price over the offer price minus one.
The relation between trading activities of insiders and market-to-book ratio is well 
documented. Rozeff and Zaman (1998) find that cross-sectionally, there are more frequent 
insider buying trades relative to selling trades for value stocks (low market-to-book stocks) 
relative to growth stocks (high market-to-book stocks), and that insider buying increases as an 
individual stock becomes a value stock from a growth stock across time. In a similar context, 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) show that insiders are contrarian traders. These results are 
confirmed by Jenter (2005) who asserts that managers time their trades to take advantage of 
the perceived mispricing, as measured by market-to-book ratio. Apart from mispricing, if the 
share price increases, insiders are likely to rebalance their portfolios by selling their stocks, 
again consistent with the portfolio theory. Market-to-book ratio captures this price induced 
portfolio rebalancing effect, in addition to potential mispricing. Thus, changes in market-to- 
book ratio, AMKTBK, enter the regressions. MKTBK is obtained by dividing MKTVAL by 
COMMEQ, in which MKTVAL is the market value of equity, measured by multiplying the 
number of common shares outstanding by the closing price at the fiscal yearend and 
COMMEQ is the total common equity (Compustat annual data item number 60). AMKTBKj 
is MKTBKt minus MKTBKt-1.
If the risk levels of their firms increase, then other things being equal, insiders will be 
inclined to sell their stock holdings because their wealth tied up to their firms become riskier. 
Meulbroek (2000) finds relatively high incidence of insider sales in internet-based firms 
characterized with high volatility. If this cross-sectional relation also holds across time, then 
an increase in return volatility will be associated with an increase in executive’s net sales, or a 
decrease in net purchase. Therefore, changes in return volatility, AVOLAT (= VOLATj -  
VOLATt-i), are expected to have a positive relation with NETSELL. VOLAT is the standard 
deviation of daily common stock returns measured over a fiscal year for each fbrm.
B. Results
In Table IV, we focus on the IPO year and the following year. The first column 
tabulates the results of OLS regressions with NETSELL regressed on SOPTGRNT, 
SOPTEXSH, RSTK SH, and SHROWNj-i. In the second column, three control variables, 
UNDERPRC, ZiMKTBK and AVOLAT, are added. White heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors are used in all the regressions in this study. As pointed out in the previous 
section (Table II), executive compensation variables are extremely right-skewed. To avoid a 
case in which a small number of extremely large observations sway the regression results 
dramatically, we exclude 2 % of the largest values of each of the four independent variables
 ^Instead o f including SHROWNj-i, Ofek and Yermack (2000) split the sample into two, and run separate 
regressions. We address this issue in the robust check section.
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(SOPTGRNT, SOPTEXSH, RSTK SH, and SHROWNj.i).  ^ We also perform the same 
regressions analyses with 1 % exclusion and no exclusion. As will be discussed later, the 
results remain qualitatively the same with or without the exclusion of outliers. Thus, for 
brevity, we report only the results with 2 % exclusion.
In Table IV, the coefficient for SOPTGRNT is not at all significant in both the first 
and second regressions. This differs from the Ofek and Yermack (2000)’s finding that 
SOPTGRNT is a significant variable. SOPTEXSH on the other hand is highly significant with 
the t-statistics in the range of 5.99-9.09, suggesting that executives sell substantial amount of 
the shares they obtain by exercising stock options. In fact, the coefficients of 0.97 and 1.07 in 
the two equations indicate that about every share acquired through option exercise is sold. 
This is consistent with the predicted relation between NETSELL and SOPTEXSH in that an 
executive attempts to diversify and rebalance his portfolio by selling newly acquired shares. 
The number of restricted stocks granted (RSTK SH), however, turns out to be insignificant, 
contrary to the result of the previous study (Ofek and Yermack (2000)).
How many shares an executive holds to begin with (SHROWNj-i) is an important 
explanatory variable. The positively significant coefficients have t-statistics in the range of 
2.99 -  3.05: the more shares an executive holds at the beginning of the year, the more shares 
he sells during the year. By selling their stock holdings, executives reduce risk exposure of 
their portfolios and realize a significant part of their wealth tied up to their firms. The 
coefficients of 0.16 in both equations indicate that an executive on average sells 16 out of 
every 100 share increase in their stock holdings.
It is noteworthy that in the second regression, none of the control variables 
(UNDERPRC, AMKTBK, AVOLAT) is significant. If we assume that underpricing proxies 
executives’ profit-taking incentives, then such profit-seeking behavior does not explain 
executive’s massive selling activities in the year following the IPO year.^
Interestingly, the insignificant result for AMKTBK is different from the findings of 
previous research. We conjecture that this might be due to the fact that the five highest paid 
executives of IPO firms examined in this study are a set far smaller than a typical set of 
insiders investigated in prior studies, in which an insider is broadly defined as a person having 
an “insider relationship” or beneficial ownership as specified by various sections of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. These insiders typically include officers, directors, and 
large block holders (10 % or more), and other beneficial shareholders whom the law specifies 
as having a special relationship with the company.
In Table V, we examine the full panel data with the years spanning from 1992 to 2004, 
the most recent year when the executive compensation data are available. The two regressions 
in Table V have the same specifications as those in Table IV with the second regression 
carrying three additional variables (UNDERPRC, AMKTBK, AVOLAT).
The results in Table V closely resemble those of Table IV. Again, SOPTEXSH and 
SHROWNt-1 are significant explanatory variables, whereas SOPTGRNT and RSTK SH are
 ^The minimum values are all zeros.
* Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) find evidence that underpricing leads to more analyst research 
coverage, which is followed by more insider selling at the expiration o f  the lockup. The study by Aggarwal et al. 
and ours differ in terms o f  the scope o f the insiders, the data sources, the variable measurement period, and the 
sample period. Exclusion o f  UNDERPRC in this model and in other models in this study does not change the 
results.
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not. SOPTEXSH has the coefficient 0.96, or about one, in both equations with the t-statistics 
10.48 and 10.57. This again shows that executives sell about every share they obtain through 
option exercise. The coefficients for SHROWNj-i, 0.10 in both equations, are also highly 
significant. Just like the results in Table IV, UNDERPRRC, AMKTBK, and AVOLAT are all 
insignificant.^ A consistent finding in both Table IV and in Table V is that what influences 
executive sales significantly are two variables; SOPTEXSH and SHROWNt-i . In other words, 
how many options an executive exercises (i.e. how many shares he acquires) and how many 
shares an executive holds to begin with are the two most important determinants of his selling 
activity.
C. Robustness check
The insignificant result for SOPTGRNT is different from the significant finding by 
Ofek and Yermack (2000), who instead of including SHROWNj.i in the regression, split the 
sample based on initial holding size and run separate regressions. We include SHROWNt-i 
explicitly in the regression, as it is an important explanatory variable to predict selling 
activities of an executive. Not surprisingly, this variable is found to be significant in all the 
regressions in this study. As part of robustness check, however, we did perform regression 
analyses with split samples similar to those in Ofek and Yermack (2000). Our results remain 
unchanged: SOPTEXSH is significant, but SOPTGRNT is not.^^
Additionally, to examine whether our findings are sensitive to potential outliers, we 
winsorized each of the four variables, SOPTGRNT, SOPTEXSH, RSTK SH, and 
SHROWNt-1 by removing 1 % of the largest observations, instead of 2 % as reported in the 
previous sections. We also perform the same analyses without excluding any observations. 
The results remain virtually unchanged whether we exclude nothing (unreported) or 1 % 
(unreported) or 2 % (reported) of the largest values.
Late 90s are characterized by high-tech business boom or ‘internet bubble’ followed 
by stock market plunge. As shown in Table I, many companies went public despite weak 
earnings and frail valuations during the high-tech boom period. To examine whether 
executive trading activities in conjunction with their compensations differ in any way in this 
internet bubble period, we split the sample into the bubble period (year 1999 and 2000) and 
the non-bubble period. Again, the results, unreported here, remain about the same regardless 
of the internet bubble period. Nevertheless, we note that while the significance of 
SOPTEXSH and SHROWNt-i persists, SOPTGRNT is significant in one regression under the 
folloMdng three simultaneous conditions: (1) the bubble period is excluded, (2) no potential 
outlier is excluded, and (3) all the years, not just the first two years of IPO, are considered 
except for the two bubble years. Once one of the conditions is relaxed, SOPTGRNT becomes 
insignificant. In particular, the result is heavily driven by a small number of extremely large 
values, as the removal of such outliers (1 % or 2 %) renders SOPTGRNT insignificant. We 
conclude that the significance of SOPTGRNT is not robust.
We also examine correlation coefficients among variables used in the regressions. In 
line with our regression results, NETSELL is highly correlated with SHROWNt-i* Among 
independent variables, we do not observe a serious multi-collinearity problem except for the
 ^Given the panel dataset, we also performed the regressions o f fixed effect and random effect models. The 
results remain about the same, and are not reported for brevity.
We can only speculate that the different results in Ofek and Yermack (2000) could be due to the fact that their 
sample is for the period 1992-1995, while ours is for IPO firms from 1992 to 2002.
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high correlation ranging from 0.36 to 0.46 between SOPTGRNT and SOPTEXSH. We run 
regressions with these two variables entering the regressions separately. The significance of 
SOPTEXSH and SHROWNt-i remains unchanged, while SOPTGRNT remains insignificant 
and no clear pattern emerges for RSTK SH. The significance of SOPTEXSH and 
SHROWNt-1 persists throughout different specifications, and is robust to inclusion of outliers 
and the high-tech boom period. We summarize our findings in the following conclusion 
section.
IV- Conclusion
This study investigates the trading activities of the executives of the firms that went 
public between 1992 and 2002. To examine what determines IPO firm executives’ trades, we 
focus on equity based compensation and its implications on net sales (or purchases) by these 
executives. IPO firms use equity based compensation heavily because they experience relative 
lack of cash compared to large, well-established firms, and also because they face enhanced 
challenge of aligning the interests of outside shareholders with those of the executives given 
the uncertainty and risk inherent in small and young IPO firms. Our findings are summarized 
as follows:
(1) IPO firm executives are significant net sellers in the year immediately following 
the IPO year. On average, IPO firm executives sell 21 % of the combined number of (i) the 
shares held at the end of the IPO year (SHROWNt-i) plus (ii) the shares obtained through 
option exercise in the year immediately following the IPO year (SOPTEXSH) plus (iii) the 
restricted shares awarded in the year immediately following the IPO year (RSTK SH). (2) 
Two significant variables affecting selling activities of IPO firm executives are the number of 
stock options exercised during the year (SOPTEXSH), and the number of shares held at the 
end of the preceding year (SHROWNj-i). In particular, about every share acquired through 
option exercise is sold. (3) The number of stock options (SOPTGRNT) and the number of 
restricted stocks (RSTK SH) turn out to be insignificant in explaining executives’ net sales. 
(4) IPO underpricing (UNDERPRC), changes in market-to-book ratio (AMKTBK), and 
changes in return volatility (AVOLAT) do not explain executives’ trades. These findings are 
robust to different specifications, inclusion of outliers and the high-tech bubble period.
We contribute to the literature by providing insights on the determinants of selling 
activities of IPO executives: as IPO firm executives sell significantly, particularly in the first 
two year period around IPO, the two significant variables affecting their sales are the number 
of shares held at the beginning of the year and the number of stock options exercised during 
the year. We do not find any convincing evidence, however, that executive net sales are 
directly linked to an explicit attempt to hedge against stock option grants, or that executives 
sell to exploit potential overvaluation as measured by market-to-book ratio, a result different 
from that of previous studies. These findings suggest that IPO executives sell mainly to 
realize a significant part of their undiversified wealth tied up to their own firms.
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Appendix:
Brief institutional details on executive stock options and restricted stocks
Since stock option and restricted stock grants are a private contract between a firm and 
its employees, compensation contracts can differ across firms. Typical stock options, however, 
expire in ten years with three to four year vesting periods or with a portion of the options 
vested every year for several years. When stock options are fully vested, the holders of the 
options can exercise them by purchasing their firms’ shares at a pre-determined exercise price. 
When stock options are granted, the exercise price is usually set at the current market price. A 
major difference between a typical executive/employee stock option and a standard exchange- 
traded option is that the executive/employee stock option is prohibited from being sold.^^
Recently, the issue of backdating stock option grant dates received much attention 
from the press. There have been studies and reports that corporations often set stock option 
grant dates retroactively so that the exercise price, typically set as the market price as of the 
grant date, is recorded low to boost the value of the stock options (Lie (2005), Narayanan and 
Seyhun (2005), Maremont (2005)). Shares obtained by stock option exercise are essentially a 
new equity issue which undergoes the same disclosure and registration procedures as any 
other new equity issue. On the other hand, new stock option grants had not been subject to 
such stringent disclosure requirements. The SEC amended the rules so that, effective as of 
August 29, 2002, insiders are required to file Form 4 within two business days of when there 
is a change in their holdings, including stock option awards. Related to this. Heron and Lie 
(2006) present evidence that such backdating practice weakened significantly following this 
SEC rule change. In January 2006, the SEC proposed new disclosure rules that require more 
specific and detailed reporting of executive pay.^
Although ownership transfer is banned for executive stock options, other derivative 
transactions are not banned, thus leaving room for managers to engage in various derivative 
arrangements with investment banks (Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2001), Smith and Eisinger 
(2004), Smith (2004)). Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2001) report a study on corporate 
insiders’ use of costless collars or equity swaps that reduce their ownership and risk exposure. 
According to Hall and Murphy (2003), some firms offer ‘cashless exercise programs,’ in 
which executives simply receive the difference between the market price and the exercise 
price either in terms of cash or shares, while most companies require executives to pay cash to 
purchase newly issued shares.
Whether or not to treat stock options as expenses was at the heart of a controversy. In
2004, FAS (Financial Accounting Standard) 123R, an amendment to FAS 123, required 
expensing the cost of equity based compensation at fair market value in financial statements. 
After some delay and a reprieve in compliance dates by the SEC, the new disclosure 
requirements now apply to large public corporations with fiscal years beginning after June 15,
2005. For small public corporations and private firms, the compliance date is December 15, 
2005.^  ^Regardless of the new rules, for tax purposes, the spread between the market and the
This does not exclude the possibility o f revising the option contract. For example, the exercise price can be re­
set, or other arrangements involving investment banks can be made possible if  stock options are out-of-the 
money for quite a while.
SEC Press Release No. 2006-10.
See SEC release number 33-8563, April 15*, 2005.
14
exercise prices has been treated as an expense and thus is tax-deductible/"^ This is one of the 
reasons why Hall and Murphy (2000) posit the ‘perceived cost hypothesis’ to explain the 
large, sub-optimal amount of stock options granted in the past decade. From the perspective 
of a company issuing stock options, options are ‘perceived’ as inexpensive and attractive, 
because the grants do not involve a cash outlay, yet the spread (market price -  exercise price) 
is tax deductible, whereas on the income statement, the option spread had not been recognized 
as an expense until the recent regulatory change.
Restricted stock, another form of equity based compensation, is restricted from being 
traded to a third party, as the name implies. Typically, restricted stock carries dividend rights 
and voting rights. Once restricted stocks are vested, then executives can sell them in the open 
market. Additionally, executives can sell shares of their own firms if those shares were 
purchased with their own funds. Executives are prohibited, however, from short-selling their 
own firms’ stocks.
This tax-deductibility applies to non-qualified stock options. For qualified stock options (or incentive stock 
options) in which employees must hold the stock for at least one year after exercise to sell, the difference 
between the selling price and the exercise price is not tax-deductible for the corporation. This is one reason why 
non-qualified stock options are the prevalent form o f  stock option. (Hall and Murphy (2003))
Securities and Exchange Act o f 1934 Section 16(c) prohibits insiders (officers, directors, and 10 % or more 
owners) from borrowing and then selling their own company stock.
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Descriptive Statistics: Executive Compensations for the Sample Firms
Table II shows equity compensation and share ownership of the five highest paid executives of the 
firms that went public for the period 1992-2002. There are 3,999 executive-years (N), starting from the 
IPO year, for 940 executives. SHROWN is the split-adjusted number of shares held by each executive 
at the yearend of a fiscal year. BLK VALU is the dollar value of stock options granted to an executive 
in a fiscal year, as measured by S&P Black-Scholes methodology. SOPTGRNT is the split-adjusted 
number of stock options granted to each executive in a fiscal year. RSTKGRNT is the dollar value, as 
of the grant date, of restricted stock granted to each executive in a fiscal year. RSTK SH is the 
estimated split-adjusted number of restricted stock granted to an executive in a fiscal year obtained by 
dividing RSTKGRNT with PRCCF, the fiscal yearend closing share price. SOPTEXSH is the split- 
adjusted number of stock options exercised by each executive in a fiscal year.
SHROWN BLK VALU SOPTGRNT RSTKGRNT RSTK SH SOPTEXSH
(shares) ($) (shares) ($) (shares) (shares)
Mean 2,201,018 1,624,116 215,166 111,026 4,605 159,728
Median 132,000 240,625 40,000 0 0 0
Maximum 902,412,500 369,311,600 172,800,000 27,868,408 1,001,020 172,800,000
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0
Skewness 36 25 59 18 16 48
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Table III
Univariate Analyses: Net Sales by Executives
Table III shows univariate analyses of net sales (NETSELL) along with SOPTGRNT, SOPTEXSH, 
RSTK_SH, and SHROWNt-i. NETSELL is defined as (RSTK SH + SOPTEXSH -  ASHROWN). 
RSTK SH is the yearly estimate for the number of restricted stocks granted to an executive obtained 
by dividing RSTKGRNT with the fiscal yearend price, in which RSTKGRNT is the dollar value, as of 
the grant date, of restricted stock granted to an executive. SOPTEXSH is the split-adjusted number of 
stock options exercised by each executive in a fiscal year. ASHROWN is (SHROWNj - SHROWNt-i) 
in which SHROWN is the number of shares held by each executive at the fiscal yearend. The low 
(high) ownership sub-sample is a sub-sample in which the number of shares held in the IPO year is 
less (greater) than the number of stock options and restricted stocks granted in the following year. The 
results of t-tests and Wilcoxon Sign Rank tests of zero mean and median are listed.
Panel A: First year after IPO Panel B: All years considered
Mean Median Mean Median
(l)SOPTGRNT 136,876 25,000 215,754 40,000
(2)SOPTEXSH 67,603 0 159,369 0
(3)RSTK_SH 3,937 0 4,605 0
(4)SHROWNt-i 1,970,423 83,679 2,021,233 149,933
(5)NETSELL 432,613 13,029 276,147 17,001
(5)/[(2)+(3)] 605% 168%
(5)/(4) 22% 16% 14% 11%
(5)/[(2)+(3)+(4)] 21% 16% 13% 11%
Hypothesis tests o f  zero mean and median NETSELL 
(first two years)
Mean Median T-test Rank test
Panel C: Entire sample
432,613 13,029 2.63 13.64
p-value 0.0087 0.0000
Panel D; Low ownership sample
86,325 1,000 3.08 4.83
p-value 0.0023 0.0000
Panel E: High ownership sample




Regression: IPO year and the following year
NETSELL from the IPO year to the following year is regressed on SOPTGRNT (or SOPTGRNTt-i), 
SOPTEXSH, RSTK_SH, SHROWNt-i, UNDERPRC, AMKTBK, and AVOLAT. NETSELL is 
defined as (SOPTEXSH + RSTK_SH -  ASHROWN). SOPTEXSH is the split-adjusted number of 
stock options exercised by each executive in a fiscal year. RSTK SH is the estimated number of 
restricted stock granted to an executive in the following year obtained by dividing RSTKGRNT with 
the average of fiscal yearend prices, in which RSTKGRNT is the dollar value, as of the grant date, of 
restricted stock granted to each executive. SOPTGRNT is the number of stock options granted to each 
executive in a fiscal year. ASHROWN is (SHROWNj SHROWNj-i) in which SHROWN is the 
number of shares held by each executive at the fiscal yearend. UNDERPRC (underpricing) is the first- 
day closing price over the offer price minus one. MKTBK, market-to-book ratio, is MKTVAL divided 
by COMMEQ, in which MKTVAL is the market value of equity (the number of common shares 
outstanding multiplied by the fiscal yearend closing share price), and COMMEQ is the total common 
equity (Compustat annual data item number 60). AMKTBK is (MKTBKTj -  MKTBKj-i). VOLAT is 
the standard deviation of daily returns measured over a fiscal year, and AVOLAT is (VOLATj -  
VOLATt.i). White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are used. * denotes the significance 
level 10 %, ** 5 %, and *** 1 %, based on a two tailed test.
variable coefficient t-stat p-value variable coefficient t-stat p-value
Intercept -49964.37 -1.36 0.1733 Intercept -31566.29 -0.78 0.4341
SOPTGRNT 0.01 0.03 0.9770 SOPTGRNT -0.01 -0.03 0.9739
SOPTEXSH ***0.97 9.09 0.0000 SOPTEXSH ***1 07 5.99 0.0000
R ST K S H 2.08 1.30 0.1952 R S T K S H 1.88 1.12 0.2643
SHROWNj.i ***0.16 2.99 0.0029 SHROWNt-1 ***0.16 3.05 0.0024
UNDERPRC -82901.18 -1.15 0.2513
AMKTBK -2870.67 -0.89 0.3750
AVOLAT 2460324.00 0.59 0.5563
R-squared 0.2160 R-squared 0.2210
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Table V
Regression: Full Panel (1992-2004)
NETSELL for the ftill panel period 1992-2004 is regressed on SOPTGRNT (or SOPTGRNTt-i), 
SOPTEXSH, RSTK_SH, SHROWNt-i, AMKTBK, and AVOLAT. NETSELL is defined as 
(SOPTEXSH + RSTK SH -  ASHROWN). SOPTEXSH is the split-adjusted number of stock options 
exercised by each executive in a fiscal year. RSTK_SH is the estimated number of restricted stock 
granted to an executive in the following year obtained by dividing RSTKGRNT w^ ith the average of 
fiscal yearend prices, in which RSTKGRNT is the dollar value, as of the grant date, of restricted stock 
granted to each executive. SOPTGRNT is the number of stock options granted to each executive in a 
fiscal year. ASHROWN is (SHROWNj - SHROWNt-i) in which SHROWN is the number of shares 
held by each executive at the fiscal yearend. UNDERPRC (underpricing) is the first-day closing price 
over the offer price minus one. MKTBK, market-to-book ratio, is MKTVAL divided by COMMEQ, in 
which MKTVAL is the market value of equity (the number of common shares outstanding multiplied 
by the fiscal yearend closing share price), and COMMEQ is the total common equity (Compustat 
annual data item number 60). AMKTBK is (MKTBKTj -  MKTBKj.i). VOLAT is the standard 
deviation of daily returns measured over a fiscal year, and AVOLAT is (VOLATt -  VOLATj-i). 
White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are used. * denotes the significance level 10 %, ** 
5 %, and ***1 %, based on a two tailed test.
variable coefficient t-stat p-value variable coefficient t-stat p-value
Intercept *-27930.13 -1.91 0.0563 Intercept -24060.12 -1.52 0.1294
SOPTGRNT 0.07 0.84 0.4026 SOPTGRNT 0.07 0.89 0.3761
SOPTEXSH ***0.96 10.57 0.0000 SOPTEXSH ***0.96 10.48 0.0000
RSTK SH -0.83 -0.65 0.5149 R ST K SH -0.85 -0.67 0.5046
SHROWNt-1 ***0.10 5.68 0.0000 SHROWNt-1 ***0.10 5.69 0.0000
UNDERPRC -20629.31 -0.74 0.4598
AMKTBK -305.34 -0.16 0.8740
AVOLAT 367003.30 0.40 0.6893
R-squared 0.1828 R-squared 0.1832
